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This article reviews the state of thinking on the governance role of public ownership and
control. Optimal governance systems depend on the path of institutional development.
Nevertheless, the transfer of operational control over productive assets to the private
sector often yields a desirable governance system, because it may be more difficult for
citizens to constrain political abuse than for governments to regulate private activity. In
weak institutional environments, however, the process needs to be structured to avoid
capture of the regulatory process. The speed of transfer should be matched to progress in
developing a strong regulatory governance system, to which certain residual rights of
intervention must be vested. After all, “institutions” are simply governance mechanisms
with some degree of autonomy from both political and private interests. The gradual cre-
ation of institutions partially shielded from political power must become central to the
development of an optimal mode of regulatory governance. The article presents sugges-
tions for establishing accountability in regulatory governance, in particular by creating
an internal control system based on a rotating board with representatives of users,
producers, and civil society, in a process involving frequent reporting and Q1disclosure.
The boundaries of state ownership have moved considerably in modern times,
following historical events, business cycles, and the ebbs and flows of economic
thinking on the role of the state in the economy.
It is difficult to date precisely the early stages of the development of the
state-owned enterprise sector. What is clear is that the economic downturn of the
1930s caused by the “Great Depression” led several European countries to intro-
duce an interventionist strategy as public demand for greater social control over
markets followed a series of devastating financial crises (hyperinflation, the 1929
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stock market crash, banking crises). The French and Belgian governments
established financial institutions that took control of the banking sector. In
Germany, from the Weimar Republic to the National Socialist period, several state
enterprises were created to foster industrialization. Similarly, in Italy in 1933 the
state-owned industrial holding company Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale
(IRI) was established to recover ailing firms and the national economy during
the fascist era. Spain imported the IRI model after the Civil War, creating the
Institudo Nacional de Industria (INI), with the aim of strengthening domestic
development, fostering import substitution, and accelerating growth in underde-
veloped areas. In Portugal the “corporative” ideology became the manifesto of
Salazar’s authoritarian regime, which aimed to keep political and economic
activity under tight public control.
After World War II decolonization created many new independent states eager
to engage in nation building and to promote development through state planning
and state enterprises. Most of the new African leaders were ideologically attracted
to the “commanding heights” of the economy and were convinced that economic
planning was the right policy to address poverty and disease (Nellis 2005). As a
consequence, several Sub-Saharan countries established socialist (and sometimes
Marxist) regimes and based their industrial policies on large-scale nationalization.
Yet the post-war experience gradually led to a drastic rethinking. Evidence
confirmed the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises, questioned the motives of
politicians in establishing direct control for regulatory purposes, and challenged
the social equity of favoring specific constituencies at high public costs.
In the early 1980s the problem of the inefficiency of state enterprises, which
were absorbing an increasing amount of public subsidies, became a priority on
the political agendas of most European countries, prompting the surge of privati-
zations that began in the 1980s and gathered momentum from 1991 onwards
after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. The restructur-
ing and privatization of the state enterprise sector became necessary not only for
modernizing economies, but also for meeting EU convergence criteria without
politically costly tax increases. Privatization in developing countries has been
spurred since the 1990s, when the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank began to make their assistance and lending conditional on privatization. In
the early period the greatest share of privatization activity came from Latin
America. After the peak of activity in 1997 revenues from privatizations declined
following the East Asian financial crisis and the Russian debt crisis of 1998. The
recent resurgence in privatizations in developing countries results from increased
activity in China and several Eastern European countries (Kikeri 2005).
After 20 years of privatizations the borders of state ownership have been
dramatically redrawn in many countries. The process has unquestionably been
successful overall. The general evidence on privatization is favorable in terms of
Page 2 of 14 The World Bank Research Observer/(2006)
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
improvement in firm performance (Megginson and Netter 2001; Kikeri and Nellis
2004). In Latin America privatization resulted in some (small) increases in
inequality in the short run, with the gains in efficiency and access to infrastruc-
ture more diffused and long term (Nellis 2000). The experiences in Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Russia, and other formerly centrally planned economies show
how voucher scheme privatization programs aimed at broad ownership among
the general public can get high-jacked by insiders. Privatization currently under
way in China, Vietnam, and other countries is also expected to have adverse
income distribution effects.
Thus the experience with privatization has provoked opposition even among
early and committed proponents, who find that privatization in some Latin
American and Eastern European countries created specific risks and social costs
(Nellis 1999).
To explore the relative merits of state and private ownership the article first
reviews the literature on ownership, discusses the main drivers of political
decision-making, and draws some conclusions on what role state ownership and
public governance more generally does or should play in regulating economic
activity. The next section introduces some of the basic tradeoffs between private
and public ownership of firms. This is followed by a discussion of the intrinsic
limits of state ownership in solving commitment problems and a section addres-
sing the risks of privatization in poorly regulated contexts. Finally, the article
develops the concept of regulatory governance, advancing some suggestions about
institutional development.
The Costs and Benefits of State Ownership: A Broad
Conceptual Framework
State enterprises exhibit significantly lower productive efficiency than comparable
privately owned enterprises.1 The main causes have been traced back to a general
absence of accountability,2 leading to a lack of managerial and employee incen-
tives toward efficiency, problems of competence or corruption by state authorities,
and the use of state enterprises for political purposes, to cater to favored
constituencies.
Russia provides a conspicuous example of political abuse and capture of state
enterprises by special interest groups. Unlike in Central Europe, the power
vacuum left after the collapse of the Soviet Union was not compensated for by
identification with the West supported by a realistic prospect of joining the
European Union. Weak legitimacy made the Yeltsin government vulnerable to the
support of special interests and led to the capture of state decisions, which further
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undermined support. A distorted corporate and regulatory governance system, in
which each strong interest sought to maximize and secure short-term gains, pro-
duced a massive build-up of nonpayment of obligations, tax evasion, and asset
theft from state enterprises (Black, Kraakman, and Tarassova 2000).
Although state ownership comes with substantial costs, it has been supported
by two arguments in the presence of such market failures as market power and
externalities (see, for example, Esfahani, Salehi, and Ardakani 2002). One that
can be called the “public commitment problem” concerns the difficulty of a
sovereign government to credibly commit to refrain from manipulating taxes
and regulations in order to collect quasi-rents on relation-specific and often
sunk assets. This discourages private investment and may result in direct
government involvement in production as a substitute. For instance, state
control of infrastructure may be the result of the unwillingness of private inves-
tors to fund large investments whose rewards, once sunk, are subject to political
decisions.
The public commitment view is buttressed by considerable evidence showing
that the size of the public sector is smaller in countries with better institutions,
especially those curbing the risk of arbitrary changes in policies, such as contract
repudiation and expropriation by the government (Knack and Keefer 1995). La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) find that government ownership of
banks is more pervasive in countries with poorly defined property rights, finding
support for Gerschenkron’s (1962) view that in these circumstances only the
government can promote financial market development.
The second argument, called the “private commitment problem,” identifies the
difficulty for regulators in controlling significant decisions by private owners
unless government has direct control over the enterprise (see Shleifer and Vishny
1994; Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997). For instance, state ownership of banks
may arise because private banks take advantage of depositors or deposit insur-
ance. Most large Russian private banks became empty boxes ahead of the 1998
crises as their capital fled abroad and liabilities piled up. Depositors and foreign
investors took large losses. In the end, the experience led most retail depositors to
turn to state-owned Sbarbank.
Both these rationales for state ownership presume that state authorities seek to
correct classic market failures such as externalities, natural monopolies, high
information costs, or public goods. Yet rather than assuming such a public objec-
tive, it seems useful to discuss under what governance forms there will be enough
public scrutiny to ensure political attention to public welfare.
In general, commitment problems apply to both private individuals and state
authorities under incomplete private contracting and its public sector counter-
part, incomplete legislation. The critical difference is that the sovereign state has
greater discretion and thus greater scope for abuse.
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For example, a typical cost of market contracting is the possibility of “lock-in.”
When the transaction extends over a long period of time and is potentially
affected by unforeseen contingencies, one party may be exposed to the risk of
exploitation when some relation-specific investments must be made. Under incom-
plete contracting these costs are usually mitigated by assigning ownership rights
to the parties most severely exposed to these risks. Under incomplete legislation
the greater scope from exploitation and abuse comes from the fact that the
government can write rules and enforce them, exposing the private party to an
additional “regulatory risk” that was absent under private contracting. Indeed,
the government can not only renege on a contract, but it can also modify legis-
lation for its own advantage.
Thus the main argument against state control arises from the combination of
broader discretionary powers and the potential for political opportunism. Given
that many developing countries have weaker institutions constraining public
abuse, the case for state control is particularly difficult precisely in contexts where
its need may in principle be the greatest.
Obviously the balance of costs and benefits of state ownership depends on the
particular path of institutional development and will therefore vary with circum-
stances. However, constraining public abuse may be more difficult than regulating
private economic activity. In that case a more desirable governance mode implies
the transfer of ownership rights to the private sector combined with open regu-
lation. While privatization is necessary for productive efficiency, open regulation is
needed to achieve allocative efficiency. This proposition implies that private owner-
ship creates better incentives to improve firm productivity but firms must be
suitably regulated in order to maximize social surplus.
There is a broad consensus that privatization usually fails to deliver much of its
potential in poor institutional contexts, when weak regulation leads to either
public or private abuse. Yet regulation can also fail, when it leads to regulatory
capture or (in the extreme cases) to state capture. Examples are the large privati-
zation programs in Chile in the late 1970s, in Mexico in the 1980s, and in Russia
in the mid-1990s. In some early Latin American privatization programs large
private investors were grossly favored in the privatization of the large state banks
that were sold cheaply and on highly leveraged terms. This enabled these inves-
tors to fund the acquisition of control over a number of privatized firms. In all
these cases the abuse of bank resources for private purposes led to brutal financial
crises, which forced the renationalization of most of these groups (Velasco 1988).
Russia’s experience is also instructive on how captured privatization programs
can undermine the authority of the state and other institutions (Perotti 2002). In
contrast, China’s gradual privatization, favoring entry while retaining control over
the process, has limited private capture of the process, although it still leaves
some uncertainty about the possibility of a gradual retreat.
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Thus the relevant notion of nonprivate governance appears to be regulatory
governance. Regulation needs to be explicit in order to expose both public policy
and private behavior to greater public scrutiny. To function properly in poor insti-
tutional contexts, however, regulatory institutions may need to be accompanied
by societal institutions that are able to detect or respond to abuse. A grassroots
form of governance may be required to create legitimacy and scope for increasing
independence from the executive branch of government. But before the mechanics
of regulatory governance and its relation with residual state ownership are
described more precisely, the following section explores the limits of state owner-
ship and control in pursuing social welfare.
Self-Interested or Benevolent Government?
Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) present the classic case for state ownership and
control, which occurs when information, contracting, and bargaining costs limit
the government’s ability to regulate by ex ante design. They also suggest that
when the government cannot determine its precise objectives due to lack of
experience, it may want to retain direct control to avoid costly contract renegotia-
tion procedures with private parties. To the extent that intervention has large
costs, state ownership (or rather, state control) is to be preferred to private owner-
ship (Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997).
Yet the regulation of state enterprises by politicians suffers serious drawbacks.
First, it is widely known that temporary powers extended to public institutions
tend to become permanent. Thus it may be difficult for dispersed citizens to inter-
vene to reverse state control once its purposes have ceased to exist. Second, it is
hard to induce politicians to represent the interest of the electorate over special
interests and to avoid conflicts of interest.
When voters are poorly informed or too dispersed to coordinate collective
responses, politicians are able to pursue special interests at the cost of the
common good. If selfish politicians are prone to corruption and patronage
(Shleifer and Vishny 1993), the inefficiency of state enterprises is due not only to
weak incentives, but also to deliberate political decisions to transfer resources to
supporters (Shleifer and Vishny 1994). Such indirect targeting, distorting pro-
ductive choices, produces inefficiency (Biais and Perotti 2002), such as excessive
employment and wages above marginal productivity.3 For instance, state enter-
prises may build plants in economically unfavorable but politically attractive
regions (Martinelli 1981). Other inefficient political benefits include the pro-
duction of goods that are not socially desirable.4 Politicians may even distort the
regulatory framework ahead of a state enterprise sale to reduce future compe-
tition, thus maximizing revenues (or bribes) at the cost of consumer surplus.
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Even ignoring the most blatant cases of political abuse, the empirical record of
state enterprises solving market failures is quite poor. Externalities such as
pollution were not visibly better managed by state enterprises than by private
firms, as the environmental situation in Eastern Europe vividly illustrates
(Grossman and Krueger 1995). Public monopolies often abuse their market
power, not necessarily by charging high prices but by tolerating sheer inefficiency,
allowing their employees a Hicksian “quiet life,” or by granting preferential treat-
ment to political constituencies (Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley 1992). This form of
internal capture has led to low rates of investment under state monopoly in many
countries. Primary examples are the energy and telecommunications sectors,
which often expanded and modernized their infrastructures only after privati-
zation and the resulting increase in competition (Bortolotti and others 2002).
If outright state ownership and control do not yield efficient outcomes, the
issue becomes how to establish a credible time path for the retreat of direct state
control to the emergence of genuine, more accountable forms of regulation.
Privatization, Regulatory Capture, and Institution Building
Privatization outcomes are heavily affected by the institutional setting in which
divestiture takes place. In countries where public regulation cannot control
private activity, the speed of privatization should be aligned with the progressive
strengthening of institutional foundations. Where the institutional foundations to
support or regulate private activities are completely missing, rapid privatization
may lead to an unacceptable loss of control over the economic system. Under
these circumstances privatization cannot escape capture and may even weaken
corporate governance (weak regulatory, bankruptcy, and takeover procedures;
corrupt legal enforcement) and lead to a loss of ultimate control over the process
and its goals. Major structural reforms can thus fail when their design leads to
regulatory capture or (in extreme cases) to state capture.
In a grand political bargain to buy out opposition to privatization most Russian
enterprises became controlled by their managers (Shleifer and Treisman 2000).
Perhaps there was no other way to securely establish private property in Russia
than to “buy in” the potential opposition. Yet it appears that the extent of control
transfer to the managers seriously weakened the ability of the state to control the
reform process. Many structural reforms, such as bank legislation, the sale of the
most valuable resource companies, the public debt market, and the provision of
currency hedges were implemented in a compromise with powerful interests.
A spectacular example of policy capture was the debt for shares deal negotiated
on the eve of the 1996 presidential elections. Through a highly dubious secured
loan a few influential banks captured control of the best natural resource
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companies, creating a number of financial– industrial groups. Cash-generating
companies in these groups were milked by controlling shareholders, leading to
major conflicts with investors and, more recently, with the new Russian govern-
ment.5 The high opportunity cost of cash payments (because of the high
appropriability of cash for managers) also fed a massive demonetization of trans-
actions and a shift to barter, an extremely inefficient payment system.6
In contrast, in China the state has retained control over privatization and
deregulation, and private capture of the reform process is more limited. While
success with privatization has been attributed to its gradualism, the critical
element may have been privatization by favoring entry rather than rapid transfer
of control. Arguably, the Chinese economy had ample underutilized resources,
and its industrialization had barely begun, so there were many free resources to
deploy. In the former Soviet Union reforms required massive reallocation of
resources frozen in inefficient production, and considerable uncertainty remains
over the possibility of further retreat.
Privatization can lead to increased efficiency and improved welfare only in set-
tings with enough capacity to ensure protection of property rights, contract enfor-
cement, control of market abuse, fair regulation and open entry, and commercial
dispute settlement based on law, not payments.
At the same time, there are enough cases of poor performance of privatiza-
tion in some contexts to acknowledge some objective limits in private control,
due primarily to regulatory inefficiency or outright capture. When the transfer
of critical assets to private ownership cannot be managed safely (in the sense of
avoiding losing control of the sale and the regulatory process), public ownership
(and control) can have a temporary role, while institution building takes place.
Indeed, under uncertain public commitment, governments can credibly inspire
confidence by selling ownership gradually, signaling a commitment to privatiza-
tion through the willingness to bear residual risk (Perotti 1995). A parallel
argument may be made that the state should keep control over decision rights
until proper regulation is in place. In both cases the argument is for temporary,
gradually decreasing residual cash flow and control rights. There is evidence
that a sustained privatization program contributes over time to resolving uncer-
tainty over political commitment to property rights and leads to financial
market development (Laeven and Perotti 2001) and to improvements in
measures of corruption and the quality of legal enforcement (Boubakri and
Cosset 2006). Q2
Yet to be feasible, the structure and role of this residual ownership form needs
to be designed with a temporary purpose from the beginning, however long
temporary may be. The suggestion is that without an explicit commitment by the
state to release control under some conditions, the process of institution building
may not even start.
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Thus the state has to be progressively removed from direct involvement in the
economy, in order to create some scope for allocating residual regulatory and
enforcement rights to new institutions. The emphasis should be on creating
increasingly professionalized and autonomous regulatory institutions that draw
their legitimacy and right to gain further autonomy from a direct, nonstate form
of governance that involves consumers and citizens to a greater extent.
Recent evidence (Djankov and others 2003; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005)
suggests that the most important institutions are those that restrain the executive
and reinforce its accountability by limiting the abuse of power over those that regu-
late relationships among individuals. The reason may be that power-restraining
institutions also correct political incentives to favor strong private interests, for
instance through control of market power, thus undermining the establishment of
a level playing field and the process of entry by new producers.7
State capture by special interests seriously weakens the credibility of enforce-
ment. While corruption accompanied transition in all countries, its extent in the
former Soviet Union led many observers to describe it as state capture, where the
corrupting agents hold more power than the corrupted officials. There is evidence
that while connected firms benefit, on average, they grow less than do firms in
economies less subject to capture (Hellmann, Jones, and Kaufmann 2000). In
Russia the private capture of the privatization process weakened the ability of the
government to control the behavior of the most powerful private owners (Perotti
2002).
Djankov and others (2003) summarize the case for a further retreat of state
ownership even in countries with poor institutions. They argue that the more civic
capital a country has, the more it is able to achieve cooperation among its
members without coercion. Civic capital, fixed in the short run, is determined by
culture, factor endowments, and history. The less civic capital a country has, the
less it can “buy” order with extra regulation. Thus less developed countries can
achieve less with regulation. Deregulation of competitive markets in less developed
countries should then count as a high priority. The presence of relatively high bar-
riers to entry in such countries suggests that regulation is often captured and tends
to hinder growth. But just as barriers to entry must be reduced, so too must regu-
latory institutions be improved. This requires a deliberate policy of greater scrutiny
and accountability through a more directly elected form of regulatory governance.
The Mechanics of Regulatory Governance
The reasoning behind this argument is straightforward. Both private agents and
the public sector face commitment problems. Since governments are sovereign
institutions, they have more difficulty than the private sector in committing to
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specific decision criteria. Ideally, government should be constrained by private
ownership, and the private sector should be constrained by regulation. Thus the
critical question shifts to the governance of regulatory institutions.
Regulatory authorities have grown throughout the developed and developing
world as a result of privatization, and they exhibit various degrees of autonomy.8
But whatever their record, the separation of ownership from regulation tends to
generate additional open scrutiny and necessarily improves the governance of the
regulatory process, at least as long as it is not captured. One of the most neglected
benefits of privatization is the increase in public scrutiny arising from the fact that
political control is exercised more at arm’s length, or in any case through explicit
legislation, so that its goals become more open to public opinion. This is compar-
able to the case of a firm with dispersed ownership obtaining a public listing, a
move that improves the quality of information available for judging its
management.
In the language of Pistor and Xu (2002) laws and regulations are necessarily
incomplete, just as private contracts are. By default, residual rights to regulate
belong to the state. Yet the authority to adjust enforcement under unspecified
contingencies could be granted to semiautonomous judicial or regulatory auth-
orities. The role of regulatory agencies is more proactive than that of courts,
which may not intervene preventively but may respond only after damaged
parties bring legal action. Provided that such regulatory institutions operate
under a framework in which they can avoid being captured, granting them pro-
gressively increasing residual enforcement rights has several advantages over the
assertion of direct state control.
Currently, the degree of regulatory autonomy is politically controlled. In per-
spective, regulatory governance could instead be made contingent on public
approval. As long as the mandate is both explicit and focused, and a reputation
can be established (as for central banks), such institutions would have less power
and appetite for secondary political goals than do politically controlled insti-
tutions. Besley and Coate (2003) argue along similar lines that politically
appointed regulators tend to pursue unrelated political goals. They report evi-
dence that U.S. states with elected regulators in place of political appointees
choose more pro-consumer policies.
Ensuring that regulators work in an independent and accountable fashion
toward their stated goals can be reinforced by a novel approach to governance.
Their mandate should be temporary and subject to public review: their governance
should include representatives of consumer and other nongovernmental organi-
zations. Governance in some traditional institutions, such as in mutual banks and
administrations of public infrastructure, has included a body of elected representa-
tives of users. This concept should be broadened and further experimented with in
other contexts as well.
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In short, governance of regulators should take a more democratic, directly
elected turn. The logic of the argument is not democratization itself. There are
agency and common good problems to this solution as well as to others. The logic
of this proposal reflects the sensible economic principle that those who benefit
most from proper regulation should be entrusted at least in part with its govern-
ance (Hansmann 1996; Besley and Coate 2003). Thus the composition of a regu-
latory board might include representatives from different constituencies and
nongovernmental organizations, elected on a rotational basis from broad lists.
The governance assignments of individual organizations might be temporary, and
extensions and rotation might be subject to public, rather than political, approval.
Regulators should be subject to explicit accountability by the establishment of
quantifiable or verifiable goals, with progress to be reported on annually. One task
of the external appointees would be to report publicly on their views on the
regulatory effort and to contribute to necessary adjustments in the statement of
regulatory intents and priorities by increasing public scrutiny.
Conclusions
The issue of public or private governance in circumstances of market failure
hinges on the relative ability to commit to fair and efficient allocation. In general
the state has greater difficulty in committing, due to its status. State ownership
should remain an extreme solution, not advisable except in circumstances when
privatization leads to uncertainty over the allocation of ultimate control. This is
evident in cases of executive power and public security, as with the army, the
police, and prisons.
In countries where private commitment is hindered by poor legal enforcement,
a case can be made for some form of state control. Yet because in such cases the
environment is also commonly associated with corrupt politicians and uncon-
strained abuse of power, the public commitment problem is even more serious.
The evidence in the recent literature clearly points to institutional development as
a precondition for the functioning of both private and public policy. Worse insti-
tutions appear to produce worse macroeconomic outcomes, even after policy
choices are controlled for.9 The conclusion is that in such environments there is
too little institutional capacity for proper state-controlled regulation, and thus the
balance should tilt in favor of more direct state control.
Of course, this is a static view only. The fact that an institutional framework is
too weak to support active state regulation suggests that institutional capacity has
to be built up, not forsaken. What are institutions if not governance mechanisms
with some degree of autonomy from both political and private interests? The
gradual creation of institutions that are partially autonomous from political
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power becomes central to the development of an optimal mode of regulatory
governance.
A residual degree of state control, rather than outright ownership, may have a
role when proper institutional mechanisms are not (yet) in place. Yet this role
must be progressively reduced by the creation of intermediate, focused regulatory
institutions that may offer some weakening of the political grip on decision-
making. The shift from government ownership to regulatory governance would
include the separation of enterprises from ministries and their corporatization, the
creation of independent regulators, and resort to temporary mixed ownership.
Such policies should allow a greater exposure to market discipline, better incen-
tives in firms, and an increased accountability toward citizens.
Notes
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1. Good surveys are found in Megginson and Netter (2001), McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003),
and Boubakri and Cosset (1999).
2. Accountability to citizens, not investors, is meant here. While state enterprises are incorpor-
ated firms, they have no private shareholders. Nor do lenders play a disciplining role, as state
enterprise debt is perceived as a public obligation.
3. Even in the United States state entities typically employ 20–30 percent more employees than
their private counterparts (Donahue 1989).
4. The development of the Concorde plane is an example (Anastassopoulos 1981).
5. Large financial– industrial groups, common in underdeveloped financial systems, certainly
owe their influence to political support, yet may provide governance and an internal capital
market to alleviate credit constraints. Empirical research on Russian financial–industrial groups
has shown that while group firms were better managed, cash was reallocated from cash-rich
group firms on a massive scale and may have been shifted outside the group (Perotti and Gelfer
2001).
6. As evidence that cash-stripping took precedence over productive activity, barter rose with
real interest rates and with ruble overvaluation. Ivanova and Wyplosz (1999) find that both
higher monetary growth and higher interest rates are correlated with higher barter.
7. Perotti and Volpin (2004) suggest that in a context of poor political accountability, estab-
lished interests can lobby successfully for regulation and even selective enforcement in their favor,
blocking entry by new firms. Thus, institutions reinforcing political and regulatory accountability
are a preliminary step to ensure proper enforcement of relationships among individuals.
8. A common criticism is that regulatory inefficiency is less observable when buried inside a
public institution than when it is subject to public scrutiny, as with public regulation of private
activity.
9. See Acemoglu and others (2003) on macroeconomic instability in poor institutional
environments.
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